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Abstract
Traditional cryptography is suffering a huge threat from the development of
quantum computing. While many currently used public-key cryptosystems
would be broken by Shor’s algorithm, the effect of quantum computing on
symmetric ones is still unclear. The security of symmetric ciphers relies heav-
ily on the development of cryptanalytic tools. Thus, in order to accurately
evaluate the security of symmetric primitives in the post-quantum world, it
is significant to improve classical cryptanalytic methods using quantum algo-
rithms. In this paper, we focus on two variants of differential cryptanalysis:
truncated differential cryptanalysis and impossible differential cryptanaly-
sis. Based on the fact that Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm can be used to find
the linear structures of Boolean functions, we propose two quantum algo-
rithms that can be used to find high-probability truncated differentials and
impossible differentials of block ciphers, respectively. We rigorously prove
the validity of the algorithms and analyze their complexity. Our algorithms
treat all rounds of the reduced cipher as a whole and only concerns the in-
put and output differences at its both ends, instead of specific differential
characteristics. Therefore, to a certain extent, they alleviate the weakness
of conventional differential cryptanalysis, namely the difficulties in finding
differential characteristics as the number of rounds increases.
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The development of quantum computing has greatly impacted classical
cryptography. Owing to Shor’s algorithm [24], many currently used public-
key cryptosystems are insecure against the adversaries in possession of quan-
tum computers, such as RSA, ElGamal and any other cryptosystems based
on discrete logarithms or factorization. This has led to the advent of post-
quantum cryptography, which studies classical systems that resist quantum
adversaries.
In light of the fact that public-key cryptography is suffering from a huge
threat due to quantum algorithms, it is natural to consider the impact of
quantum attacks on symmetric cryptosystems. A representative example is
Grover’s search algorithm [8], which can provide a quadratic speedup for
any generic exhaustive key search. This indicates that in the post-quantum
world, the key lengths of symmetric primitives need to be doubled to maintain
an equivalent ideal security. However, exhaustive key-search attack only
defines the ideal security. To understand the real security of symmetric
primitives, it is necessary to study how other attacks can be performed by
quantum adversaries in the real world. This direction has draw more and
more attention in recent years.
Simon’s algorithm was proposed in 1997 [25] and has been applied to
the analysis of symmetric cryptography. Given a Boolean function with cer-
tain promise, one can apply Simon’s algorithm to find its periods. Based
on this, Kuwakado and Morii constructed a quantum distinguisher for the
three-round Feistel scheme [15], which has been proved to be a secure pseudo-
random permutation in classical setting [19]. Afterwards, they further used
Simon’s algorithm to extract the key of the Even-Mansour scheme [16]. These
two results embody the advantages of quantum algorithms in symmetric
cryptanalysis. Santoli and Schaffner subsequently extended the result in [15]
and relaxed the assumption that the internal function of the three-round
Feistel scheme must be permutations [23]. In the same paper, they also pre-
sented a quantum forgery attack to the CBC-MAC scheme. Simultaneously,
Kaplan et al. also proved that the attack on the Feistel scheme in [15] can be
extended to the situation where the internal function is not a permutation
by a different approach [9]. Furthermore, they also used Simon’s algorithm
to attack other symmetric schemes, such as GMAC, CLOC and so on. These
attacks are all in the context of quantum chosen-plaintext attack [5, 7]. Roet-
teler and Steinwandt, however, apply Simon’s algorithm to related-key attack
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[22]. They showed that, under certain conditions, the access to query super-
positions of related keys to a block cipher enables the attacker to extract the
secret key efficiently.
Although these results are striking, they are still not enough to evaluating
the actual security of ciphers in post-quantum world. In symmetric cryptog-
raphy, designers demonstrate the security of schemes by proving that they
can resist some specific attacks. The security of ciphers relies heavily on the
development of cryptanalytic tools. Therefore, using quantum techniques
to improve the main classical analytic tools, such as differential cryptanaly-
sis and linear cryptanalysis, is significant for the design of quantum-secure
symmetric cryptosystems.
The idea of applying quantum algorithms in differential cryptanalysis was
first considered in [27]. The authors applied Grover’s algorithm in the key-
recovery phase and obtained a quadratic speedup. Afterwards, Kaplan et
al. further studied the application of Grover’s algorithm in cryptanalysis
and applied it in the key-recovery phases of various variants of differential
and linear attacks [10]. On the other hand, Li and Yang focused on the
first phase of differential cryptanalysis and applied Bernstein-Vazirani (BV)
algorithm [1] to finding high-probability differentials of block ciphers [18].
Their algorithm has a obvious flaw, which has been solved by Xie and Yang
in [26]. In this paper, we will further develop these works and apply BV
algorithm to truncated differential cryptanalysis and impossible differential
cryptanalysis.
Quantum Attackers. There are two types of quantum attackers that have
been studied in previous papers. The first type can perform quantum oper-
ations and make classical queries on the cryptographic primitives, denoted
as Q1. The second type, in addition to quantum operations and classical
queries, can also make quantum queries on the cryptographic oracle, denoted
as Q2. That is, Q2-type quantum attackers can query the cryptographic or-
acle directly with superposition state, and obtains the superposition of the
corresponding outputs. The second type is more demanding on the attackers’
power, because the access to the quantum oracle of cryptographic primitives
is difficult to achieve for the attacker in practice.
Complexity. In general, the efficiency of an attack can be defined by three
parameters: data complexity, time complexity and memory complexity. The
data complexity is the amount of queries made by the attacker; the time
complexity is the time it takes to execute the attack; and the memory com-
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plexity is the memory required for the attack. We assume that a query needs
one unit of time, then the data complexity is contained in the time com-
plexity. Therefore, when analyze the complexity of an algorithm, we only
need to consider its time complexity and memory complexity. Specifically,
time complexity can be divided into two parts: the time required to execute
the quantum computing part and the time required to execute the classical
computing part. For the first part, since any quantum circuit can be ex-
pressed in terms of gates in some reasonable, universal, finite set of unitary
quantum gates [20], the corresponding complexity is the number of universal
gates. For the second part, the time complexity is equal to the number of
elementary operations plus the number of classical queries. (We do not take
quantum query into account since all attack algorithms in this paper only
need Q1-type attackers.) As for the memory complexity, since the cost of
storing quantum information is much greater than classical information, it is
expressed as the amount of qubits needed to perform the algorithm.
Based on the above discussion, in this paper we analyze the complexity of
a quantum algorithm from three perspectives: the number of universal gates,
the time complexity corresponding to the classical computing part and the
amount of qubits needed in the algorithm.
Our contributions. In this paper, we proceed with previous works and
further explore how to apply quantum algorithms to classical cryptanalytic
tools. We focus on two variants of differential cryptanalysis: truncated differ-
ential cryptanalysis and impossible differential cryptanalysis. Based on the
fact that BV algorithm can be used to find the linear structures of Boolean
functions, we propose two quantum algorithms for finding high-probability
truncated differentials and impossible differentials. Afterwards, we rigor-
ously prove the validity of the algorithms and analyze its complexity. The
amounts of universal gates and qubits needed by these two algorithms are
both polynomials of n, where n is the blocksize.
The proposed algorithms for finding high-probability truncated differen-
tials and impossible differentials have following advantages:
• In conventional truncated differential cryptanalysis, the attacker finds high-
probability truncated differentials by searching for a high-probability trun-
cated differential characteristic. However, as the number of rounds increases,
the probability of differential characteristics will usually decreases dramati-
cally. Therefore, using traditional method to find high-probability truncated
differentials will become more and more difficult as the number of rounds
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increases. Classical miss-in-the middle technique has the similar problem,
because it finds probability-1 differentials also based on differential charac-
teristics. By contrast, our algorithms only concerns the input and output
differences at both ends of the cipher, instead of a specific differential char-
acteristic, so the increase in the number of rounds has a much smaller effect
on them. Therefore, our algorithms should work better than traditional
methods when the number of rounds of the block cipher is large.
• Since traditional methods of finding high-probability truncated differentials
is based on differential characteristics, it can only find the high-probability
truncated differentials whose input and output differences can be connected
by a high-probability differential characteristic. However, a high-probability
truncated differential does not imply a high-probability truncated differential
characteristic. This kind of truncated differentials is actually restrictive.
By contrast, our algorithm only concerns the input and output differences
at both ends, and thus can find more general high-probability truncated
differentials.
• The proposed quantum algorithms do not require quantum queries. This
makes the differential attacks based on these algorithms more practical. Be-
ing able to query the cryptographic oracle in quantum superpositions is actu-
ally a strong requirement for the attacker’s ability. Many recently proposed
quantum algorithms for attacking block ciphers, such as the algorithms in
[9, 15, 16, 23], require quantum queries. Compared with these algorithms,
our algorithms are easier to implement for quantum attackers in practice.
Related work. In [10], Kaplan et al. also studied the quantum truncated
differential cryptanalysis. They applied Grover’s algorithm in the key re-
covering phase, while we focus on the first phase of truncated differential
cryptanalysis, namely, finding a high-probability truncated differential. Im-
possible differential attack is investigated both in [26] and in this paper.
The quantum algorithm proposed in [26], however, finds impossible differ-
entials directly, and can only find the impossible differentials that have a
special structure, while our algorithm uses the miss-in-the-middle technique
and can find more general impossible differentials.
1. Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we denote an arbitrary block cipher as E, and
assume it can be implemented efficiently as a quantum circuit. Since any
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quantum circuit can be expressed in terms of gates in some universal, finite
set of unitary quantum gates [20], E can be executed by a quantum circuit
composed of gates in the universal set. Let |E|Q denote the amount of uni-
versal gates in the circuit, and n denote the blocksize of E. If E can be
computed in polynomial time with respect to n, then |E|Q is a polynomial
of n.
1.1. Linear structure of Boolean functions
Let F2 = {0, 1} denote a finite field of characteristic 2. F
n
2 is the n-
dimension vector space over F2. Bn denotes the set of all Boolean functions
from Fn2 to F2. The notion of linear structure has been studied for their
cryptanalytic significance [6, 17, 21], and is defined as follows:
Definition 1. Suppose f is a Boolean function in Bn. A vector a ∈ F
n
2 is
called a linear structure of f if
f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = f(a) + f(0), ∀x ∈ Fn2 ,
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive-or, and + denotes the addition opera-
tion in F2.
Let Uf denote the set of all linear structures of f , and
U if := {a ∈ F
n
2 |f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = i, ∀x ∈ F
n
2}
for i = 0, 1. It is obvious that Uf = U
0
f∪U
1
f . The linear structure of a Boolean
function has a close relation with its Walsh spectrum, whose definition is:
Definition 2. Suppose f ∈ Bn, the Walsh spectrum of f is also a function
in Bn, and is defined as
Sf : F
n
2 −→ F2
ω −→ Sf (ω) =
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x)+ω·x.
For any function f ∈ Bn, let Nf = {ω ∈ F
n
2 |Sf(ω) 6= 0}. The following
lemma shows the link between the Walsh spectral and the linear structure.
Lemma 1 ([6], Corollary 1). For any f ∈ Bn, i ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that
U if = {a ∈ F
n
2 |ω · a = i, ∀ω ∈ Nf}.
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According to Lemma 1, given a sufficiently large subset H of Nf , one
may be able to obtain U if by solving the linear system {x · ω = i|ω ∈ H}.
(Solving the linear system {x · ω = i|ω ∈ H} means finding vectors x such
that x · ω = i holds for ∀ω ∈ H .)
For any positive integersm,n, let Cm,n denote the set of Boolean functions
from Fm2 to F
n
2 . The linear structure of the functions in Cm,n is defined as
following:
Definition 3. Suppose F ∈ Cm,n. A vector a ∈ F
m
2 is said to be a linear
structure of F if there is a vector α ∈ Fn2 such that
F (x⊕ a)⊕ F (x) = α, ∀x ∈ {0, 1}m.
Suppose F = (F1, F2, · · · , Fn). It is obvious that a vector is a linear
structure of F if and only if it is a linear structure of Fj for all j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Thus, we can obtain the linear structures of F by first finding the linear
structures of every component function Fj separately, and then picking out
the common ones. Let UF be the set of the linear structures of F , and
UαF = {a ∈ F
m
2 |F (x⊕ a)⊕ F (x) = α, ∀x}. It is obvious that UF = ∪αU
α
F .
1.2. Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm
BV algorithm was proposed by Bernstein and Vazirani [1]. It solves the
following problem: given the permission to query a function f(x) = a · x
with superposition states, where a ∈ {0, 1}n is a secret string, find a. BV
algorithm works as follows:
1. Apply the Hadamard operator H(n+1) to the initial state |ψ0〉 = |0〉
⊗n|1〉
to obtain the state |ψ1〉 =
∑
x∈Fn2
|x〉√
2n
· |0〉−|1〉√
2
.
2. Query the quantum oracle of f , giving the state |ψ2〉 =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x)|x〉√
2n
|0〉−|1〉√
2
.
3. Discard the last qubit, and apply the Hadamard gates H(n) to the rest n
qubits again to obtain the state
|ψ3〉 =
∑
y∈Fn2
(
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x)+y·x)|y〉. (1)
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Since f(x) = a · x, we have
|ψ3〉 =
∑
y∈Fn2
(
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)(a⊕y)·x)|y〉 = |a〉.
Thus, measuring |ψ3〉 in the computational basis gives the vector a with
a probability of one.
According to Eq.(1), if we apply the BV algorithm to a general function f
in Bn, the resulting state before measurement will be
∑
y∈Fn2 Sf(y)|y〉, where
Sf(·) is the Walsh spectrum of f . By measuring this state in the computa-
tional basis, we will get a vector y ∈ Fn2 with probability Sf(y)
2. Therefore,
running BV algorithm on f always gives a vector in Nf .
Let |f |Q be the number of universal gates in the quantum circuit that
implements f . Running BV algorithm on f requires a total of 2n+ 1+ |f |Q
universal gates and one quantum query. The amount of qubits needed to
perform BV algorithm is n+1. Based on Lemma 1 and the fact that applying
BV algorithm to f always gives a vector in Nf , a quantum algorithm that
finds nonzero linear structures was proposed in [17]:
Algorithm 1
Initialization: Let p(n) be an arbitrary polynomial of n. Φ denotes the null
set. Initialize the set H := Φ.
1: for p = 1, 2, · · · , p(n) do
2: run BV algorithm on f to obtain an n-bit output ω ∈ Nf
3: let H = H ∪ {ω};
4: end for
5: solve the linear systems {x · ω = i|ω ∈ H} to obtain solutions Ai for
i = 0, 1, respectively;
6: if A0 ∪A1 ⊆ {0} then
7: output “No” and halt;
8: else
9: output A0 and A1;
10: end if
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For an arbitrary function f ∈ Bn, let
δ′f =
1
2n
max
a∈Fn2
a/∈Uf
max
i∈F2
|{x ∈ Fn2 |f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = i}|. (2)
It is obvious that δ′f < 1. Intuitively, the smaller δ
′
f is, the better it is to rule
out the vectors that are not the linear structure of f when running Algorithm
1. The following two theorems justify the validity of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1 ([17], Theorem 4.1). If applying Algorithm 1 to a function
f ∈ Bn outputs sets A
0 and A1, then for any vector a ∈ Ai (i = 0, 1), any ǫ
satisfying 0 < ǫ < 1, we have
Pr
[
1−
|{x ∈ Fn2 |f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = i}|
2n
< ǫ
]
> 1− e−2p(n)ǫ
2
. (3)
Theorem 2 ([26], Theorem 2). Suppose f ∈ Bn and δ
′
f ≤ p0 < 1 for
some constant p0. If applying Algorithm 1 to f with p(n) = n queries returns
the sets A0 and A1, then for any a /∈ U if (i = 0, 1), we have that
Pr[a ∈ Ai] ≤ pn0
These two theorems are proved in [17] and [26], respectively. Theorem
1 states that the vectors in A0 and A1 have a high probability of being
approximate linear structures of f . Theorem 2 demonstrates that, under
assumption that δ′f ≤ p0 < 1, the probability of Algorithm 1 after O(n)
quantum queries outputting a vector that is not a linear structure of f is
negligible.
Although Algorithm 1 needs to query the quantum oracle of f , we stress
that, the quantum algorithms for finding high-probability truncated differ-
entials and impossible differentials proposed in this paper do not require
quantum queries.
1.3. Differential cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis was proposed by Biham and Shamir [4], which
exploits the existence of high-probability differentials. Let E denote a r-
round block cipher and n be the blocksize of E. For t ∈ {1, · · · , r}, E(t)
denotes the reduced version of E with t rounds. Let F denote the function
that maps the plaintext to the input of the last round of E, i.e. F = E(r−1),
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and K be the key space of F . The input of F includes a plaintext block and
a key in K. When fix a specific key k ∈ K, the action of F on a block x is
denoted by Fk(x). Suppose Fk(x) = y, Fk(x
′) = y′, then the input difference
is given by ∆x = x ⊕ x′ and the output difference is given by ∆y = y ⊕ y′.
The pair (∆x,∆y) is called a differential of Fk. Differential cryptanalysis
can be divided into two stages: (I) finding some high-probability differential
of Fk; and (II) using the found high-probability differential to recover the
subkey of the last round.
Several variants of differential cryptanalysis have been developed, such
as truncated differential attack [14] and impossible differential attack [2].
They all exploit some non-random statistical patterns in the distribution of
cipher difference. According to the definition of linear structure, if Fk has a
linear structure x ∈ UαFk for some α ∈ F
n
2 , then (x, α) is also a probability-1
differential of Fk. Likewise, if x is an approximate linear structure of Fk, then
there is a vector α such that (x, α) is a high-probability differential of Fk. In
light of this relation between linear structures and differentials, we can apply
Bernstrin-Vazirani algorithm in various variants of differential cryptanalysis.
2. Quantum truncated differential cryptanalysis
Truncated differential cryptanalysis was introduced by Knudsen [14] and
has been applied to many symmetric cryptosystems [12, 13, 14]. In a con-
ventional differential attack, the attacker considers the full difference of two
texts, while the truncated differential cryptanalysis analyzes differences that
are only partially determined. That is, the attacker only predicts part of the
bits instead of the entire block.
We still consider a r-round block cipher E and its reduced version F =
E(r−1). Let K and S be the key spaces of the first r − 1 rounds and the last
round of E, respectively. When fix a specific key k ∈ K, the action of F on a
block x is denoted by Fk(x). Suppose (∆x,∆y) is a differential of Fk. If ∆x
′
is a subsequence of ∆x and ∆y′ is a subsequence of ∆y, then (∆x′,∆y′) is
called a truncated differential of Fk. In this paper, we only consider the case
in which the input difference is a full difference, i.e. ∆x′ = ∆x. The bits that
appear in ∆y′ are called predicted bits, and the others are called unpredicted
bits. If a full output difference ∆z satisfies that the predicted bits of ∆y′ are
equal to the corresponding bits of ∆z, then we say ∆z matches ∆y′, denoted
∆z = ∆y′.
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Truncated differential cryptanalysis consists of two stages. In the first
stage, the attacker searches for a high-probability truncated differential (∆x,∆y′)
of Fk. In the second stage, the attacker recovers the key of the last round
using the found truncated differential (∆x,∆y′). Specifically, he fixes the
input difference ∆x and makes classical queries to obtain 2N ciphers. Then
for each s ∈ S, he decrypts the last round to get N output differences of Fk,
and counts the number of them that match ∆y′. The correct key is likely to
be the one with the maximum count.
The success probability and the number of ciphertext pairs needed in the
counting scheme are related to the signal to noise ratio [4], which is defined
as:
S/N =
|S| × p
γ × λ
,
where |S| is the number of possible candidate keys of the last round, p is
the probability of the used truncated differential, γ is the average count
contributed by each pair of plaintexts, and λ is the ratio of non-discarded
pairs to all pairs. We only consider the case in which λ = 1. If S/N ≤ 1,
then the truncated differential attack will not succeed. Thus, we need to find
truncated differentials whose the signal to noise ratio is larger than 1. The
larger S/N is, the better it is for recovering the key. Further details about
S/N can be found in Appendix A.
The quantum algorithm we will propose is applied to the first stage of
truncated differential cryptanalysis, i.e. finding a high-probability truncated
differential. In traditional truncated differential cryptanalysis, since the key
of the reduced cipher Fk is unknown to the attacker, he actually needs to
find a high-probability truncated differential that is independent of the key,
namely, a truncated differential that has a high probability regardless of the
value of k. Even though our quantum algorithm cannot find key-independent
high-probability truncated differentials, it can find truncated differentials
which have high probability for most of the keys in K. In more detail, for
any polynomial q(n), the attacker can execute the algorithm properly so
that the output truncated differentials have high probability for more than
(1− 1
q(n)
) proportion of the keys in K.
We present the algorithm in Section 3.1, and analyze its validity, com-
plexity and advantages in Section 3.2.
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2.1. Quantum algorithm for finding truncated differentials
Suppose the reduced cipher Fk = (Fk,1, Fk,2, · · · , Fk,n). Intuitively, we can
use Algorithm 1 to find the approximate linear structures of each component
function Fk,j (1 ≤ j ≤ n). Every approximate linear structure of Fk,j can
induce a high-probability differential of it. If there exist several component
functions having the same approximate linear structure, then it can induce a
high-probability truncated differential of Fk. The positions of the predicted
bits correspond to the positions of these component functions. However, the
problem is that calling Algorithm 1 requires to query Fk with quantum su-
perpositions. This cannot be done since the attacker does not know the value
of k. In traditional differential attack, the attacker cannot query the reduced
cipher Fk, either. He therefore analyze the properties of the block cipher and
tries to find high-probability truncated differentials independent of the key.
This inspires us to also look for key-independent high-probability truncated
differentials, or at least, the truncated differentials whose probability is high
for most of the keys.
To achieve this goal, we consider the reduced cipher F without specifying
the key. Suppose K = {0, 1}m. The function
F : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m −→ {0, 1}n
( x , k ) −→ Fk(x)
is determined and known to the attacker. Therefore, the attacker can use a
quantum circuit to implement the operator
UF : |x, k〉|y〉 → |x, k〉|y ⊕ F (x, k)〉
efficiently. The number of universal gates in the circuit is denoted by |F |Q,
which is a polynomial of n and m. Let F = (F1, · · · , Fn). Each component
function Fj can also be implemented by efficient quantum circuit, and the
number of universal gates of the corresponding circuit is denoted by |Fj|Q. It
is obvious that
∑n
j=1 |Fj|Q = |F |Q. Since the attacker can perform the quan-
tum circuit of each Fj by himself, he can execute Algorithm 1 on Fj without
the need for quantum queries. Therefore, the attacker can use Algorithm
1 to find high-probability truncated differentials of F . He first runs Algo-
rithm 1 to obtain the approximate linear structures of each Fj , then chooses
a vector that is common approximate linear structure of multiple component
functions F ′js as the input difference of the truncated differential.
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However, our goal is not to find a high-probability truncated differential
of F , but to find a high-probability truncated differential of Fk. Note that
the input of Fj includes a plaintext block and a key in K, so the approximate
linear structure we obtain by applying Algorithm 1 on Fj has n + m bits,
including n-bit plaintext difference ∆x and m-bit key difference ∆k. In
order to use it to induce a differential of Fk, the key difference ∆k needs to
be zero. To this end, we only need to discard the last m bits of the output
vector when calling BV algorithm. Specifically, the quantum algorithm for
finding high-probability truncated differentials of Fk is as follows:
[H] Algorithm 2
Initialization: The quantum circuit for implementing each Fj (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
is given. q(n) is an arbitrary polynomial chosen by the attacker. σ ∈ [0, 1)
is a constant and is also chosen by the attacker. Let p(n) = 1
2σ2
q(n)2n3
and initialize the set H := Φ.
1: for j = 1, 2, · · · , n do
2: for p = 1, · · · , p(n) do
3: run BV algorithm on Fj to obtain an (n+m)-bit output ω =
4: (ω1, · · · , ωn, ωn+1, · · · , ωn+m) ∈ NFj ;
5: let H = H ∪ {(ω1, · · · , ωn)};
6: end for
7: solve the linear systems {x · ω = ij |ω ∈ H} to obtain the set A
ij
j for
ij = 0, 1,
8: respectively;
9: Let Aj = A
0
j ∪ A
1
j and H = Φ;
10: end for
11: for t = n, n− 1, · · · , 1 do
12: if S/N = 2t(1− σ) > 1 then
13: if there exist t different j1, · · · , jt s.t. Aj1 ∩ · · · ∩Ajt ) {0} then
14: choose an arbitrary nonzero vector a ∈ Aj1 ∩ · · · ∩ Ajt ;
15: Let
bj =
{
ij, j ∈ {j1, · · · , jt}
×, j /∈ {j1, · · · , jt},
16: where j = 1, 2, · · · , n, and ij is the superscript such that a ∈
A
ij
j ;
17: Let b = (b1, · · · , bn), output (a, b) and stop;
18: end if
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19: else
20: output “No” and stop;
21: end if
22: end for
23: Output “No” and stop;
Lines 1-10 of Algorithm 2 are for finding the approximate linear structures
of Fj for each j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. Lines 11-22 are for picking out a vector such
that it is a common approximate linear structure of as many Fj as possible.
The output (a, b) is a truncated differential of Fk. The symbol “×” in vector
b denotes the unpredicted bits. When the attacker executes a truncated
differential attack, he first chooses a constant σ and a polynomials q(n),
then runs Algorithm 2 to obtain a truncated differential (a, b). According
to Theorem 3 presented in the next subsection, (a, b) is a high-probability
truncated differential of Fk for most keys in K. In more detail, except for a
negligible probability, for more than (1− 1
q(n)
) of the keys in K, the truncated
differential (a, b) has a probability greater than 1− σ.
To justify the feasibility of recovering the key of the last round using
(a, b), we need to demonstrate that the signal to noise ratio S/N is greater
than 1. To do this, we first estimate the value of γ, i.e. the average count
contributed by each plaintext pair. Suppose t bits of b are predicted, there
are 2n−t output differences matching b in total. In counting scheme, each pair
of plaintexts will be decrypted by |S| keys separately. The corresponding |S|
output differences obtained by this process can be seen as random. Thus for
each pair of plaintexts, there are
γ =
2n−t
2n
× |S| =
|S|
2t
keys counted on average. Therefore,
N/S ≥
|S| × (1− σ)
|S|
2t
× 1
= 2t(1− σ) > 1.
The last “>” holds since we require that 2t(1 − σ) > 1 in Algorithm 2 (line
12). After obtaining the truncated differential (a, b), the attacker can use it
to recover the subkey of the last round as in classical truncated differential
cryptanalysis. This attack works for more than (1 − 1
q(n)
) of the keys in K.
Even if Algorithm 2 outputs “No”, the attacker can adjust the values of q(n),
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σ and try again.
2.2. Analysis of the algorithm
In this section, we discuss the validity, complexity and advantages of
Algorithm 2.
2.2.1. Validity
To demonstrate the validity of Algorithm 2, we first give the following
theorem:
Theorem 3. If running Algorithm 2 returns a truncated differential (a, b),
then except for a negligible probability, there exists a subset K′ ⊆ K, such
that |K′|/|K| > 1− 1
q(n)
, and for each k ∈ K′, it holds that
|{x ∈ Fn2 |Fk(x⊕ a) + Fk(x) = b}|
2n
> 1− σ.
That is, except for a negligible probability, the output (a, b) is a truncated
differential of Fk whose probability is greater than 1−σ for more than (1−
1
q(n)
)
of the keys in K. ( Here,“=” means that Fk(x⊕ a) + F (x) matches b. )
Proof. Suppose t bits of b is predicted, and the corresponding positions of
the predicted bits are j1, · · · , jt. Let (a‖0, · · · , 0) be the vector obtained by
appending m zeros to a. Since a · (ω1, · · · , ωn) = 0 implies that
(a‖0, · · · , 0) · (ω1, · · · , ωn, ωn+1, · · · , ωn+m) = 0,
the vector (a‖0, · · · , 0) can be viewed as an output of Algorithm 1 on Fjs for
all s = 1, 2, · · · , t. According to Theorem 1, we have that
|{z ∈ Fn+m2 |Fjs( z ⊕ (a‖0, · · · , 0) )⊕ Fjs(z) = bjs)}|
2n+m
> 1− ǫ, ∀s = 1, 2 · · · , t
(4)
holds with a probability greater than (1−e−2p(n)ǫ
2
)t. If Eq.(4) holds, we have
that the amount of z satisfying
Fjs
(
z ⊕ (a‖0, · · · , 0)
)
⊕ Fjs(z) = bjs (5)
for both s = 1 and s = 2 is more than 2n+m[2(1 − ǫ) − 1] = 2n+m(1 −
2ǫ). Likewise, the amount of z satisfying Eq.(5) for all s = 1, 2, 3 is more
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than 2n+m(1 − 3ǫ). By induction, it is easy to verify that the amount of z
satisfying Eq.(5) for all s = 1, 2, · · · , t is more than 2n+m(1− tǫ). Thus, with
a probability greater than (1− e−2p(n)ǫ
2
)t, it holds that
|{z ∈ Fn+m2 |F ( z ⊕ (a‖0, · · · , 0) )⊕ F (z) = b)}|
2n+m
> 1− tǫ.
Here, “=” means that F ( z ⊕ (a‖0, · · · , 0) ) ⊕ F (z) matches b. Therefore,
with a probability greater than (1− e−2p(n)ǫ
2
)t, it holds that
|{(x, k) ∈ Fn2 × F
m
2 |Fk(x⊕ a)⊕ Fk(x) = b}|
2n+m
> 1− tǫ. (6)
Let
V (k) =
|{x ∈ Fn2 |Fk(x⊕ a) + Fk(x) = b}|
2n
.
Eq.(6) indicates that Ek[V (k)] > 1 − tǫ, where Ek[V (k)] is the expectation
of V (k) when k is chosen randomly and uniformly from {0, 1}m. Thus, if
Eq.(6) holds, then for any polynomial q(n), we have
Prk
[
V (k) > 1− q(n)tǫ
]
> 1−
1
q(n)
.
Otherwise, we have Prk[1− V (k) ≥ q(n)tǫ] ≥
1
q(n)
, then
Ek[V (k)]
=1− Ek[1− V (k)]
≤1−
1
q(n)
· q(n)tǫ
=1− tǫ,
which contradicts that Ek[V (k)] > 1− tǫ. Therefore, if Eq.(6) holds, then for
more than (1− 1
q(n)
) of the keys in K, we have V (k) > 1− q(n)tǫ. Let K′ be
the set of these keys, then |K′|/|K| > 1− 1
q(n)
, and for each k ∈ K′, we have
V (k) =
|{x ∈ Fn2 |Fk(x⊕ a) + Fk(x) = b}|
2n
> 1− q(n)tǫ.
Let ǫ = σ
q(n)t
. Noticing that p(n) = 1
2σ2
q(n)2n3, the probability of Eq.(6)
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holding is greater than 1−ne−n. Therefore, except for a negligible probability,
there exist a subset K′ ⊆ K satisfying |K′|/|K| > 1− 1
q(n)
, and for any k ∈ K′,
|{x ∈ Fn2 |Fk(x⊕ a) + Fk(x) = b}|
2n
> 1− q(n)tǫ = 1− σ,
which completes the proof.

When executing truncated differential cryptanalysis, the attacker first
runs Algorithm 2. Except for a negligible probability, the output (a, b) is a
truncated differential of Fk whose probability is greater than 1− σ for more
than (1 − 1
q(n)
) of the keys in K. Then the attacker uses it to recover the
subkey of the last round as in classical truncated differential cryptanalysis.
This attack works for more than (1− 1
q(n)
) of the keys in K. The number of
pairs needed by the counting scheme is related to the signal to noise ratio
S/N . The higher S/N is, the fewer pairs of plaintexts are needed. It is
observed experimentally that while S/N is 1− 2, about 20-40 occurrences of
right pairs are sufficient [4]. (See Appendix A for more details.) Thus, about
40
1−σ pairs of plaintexts are enough.
2.2.2. Complexity.
We analyze the complexity of Algorithm 2 from three perspectives: the
number of universal gates, the time complexity of classical computing part
and the amount of qubits needed.
Amount of universal gates. For each j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, Algorithm 2
needs to execute BV algorithm on Fj for p(n) times, and each time needs
2(n + m) + 1 + |Fj |Q universal gates. Thus, the total amount of needed
universal gates is
p(n)
n∑
j=1
[
2(n+m) + 1 + |Fj|Q
]
=p(n)
[
2n2 + (2m+ 1)n+
n∑
j=1
|Fj |Q
]
=
1
2σ2
q(n)2n3
[
2n2 + (2m+ 1)n+ |F |Q
]
,
which is a polynomial of n.
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Time complexity of classical computing part. The classical com-
puting part includes two phases:
(I) solving linear systems {x · ω = ij |ω ∈ H} for all j = 1, 2, · · · , n and
ij = 0, 1;
(II) finding the intersection of the sets Aj
′s.
For the first phase, the attacker needs to solve 2n linear systems, each
one has p(n) linear equations and n variables. The complexity of solving
a linear system with µ equations and ν variables by Gaussian elimination
method is O(µν2). Thus, the complexity of the first phase is O(2p(n)n3) =
O( 1
σ2
q(n)2n6).
For the second phase, the attacker first lets t = n, if A1 ∩ · · · ∩An ) {0},
then chooses an arbitrary nonzero vector a in the intersection. Otherwise,
the attacker lets t = n − 1. If there exist n − 1 sets Aj1, · · · , Ajn−1 such
that Aj1 ∩ · · · ∩ Ajn−1 ) {0}, then he chooses an arbitrary nonzero vector
a in the intersection. Otherwise, he lets t = n − 2. The attacker continues
this process until the value of t is too small to satisfy the condition that
S/N = 2t(1 − σ) > 1, or finding the intersection of t sets requires too many
calculations. Supposing α = maxj |Aj|, finding the intersection of t sets by
sort method needs O(tα logα) calculations. Thus, selecting t sets from Aj
′s
that have nonzero common vectors needs O(
(
n
t
)
tα logα) calculations. Let
t0 be the minimum t that satisfies 2
t(1 − σ) > 1, then the complexity of
the second phase is O(
∑n
t=t0
(
n
t
)
tα logα). The value of α is determined by
the properties of the attacked block cipher. It is generally small because a
well constructed cipher should not have many approximate linear structures.
Furthermore, the attacker can reduce the value of α by choosing a larger
p(n). In practice, the attacker can choose a polynomial g(n) to represent the
upper bound of his computational power. As long as
(
n
t
)
tα logα is greater
than g(n), he stops the process. In this situation the complexity of the second
part is O(ng(n)).
To sum up, the complexity of classical computing part is O( 1
σ2
q(n)2n6 +∑n
t=t0
(
n
t
)
tα logα). If the attacker chooses a polynomial g(n) to bound the
amount of calculations, and tries from t = n, n−1, n−2 · · · until 2t(1−σ) ≤ 1
or
(
n
t
)
tα logα is larger than g(n), then the complexity of classical computing
part is O( 1
σ2
q(n)2n6 + ng(n)), which is a polynomial of n.
Amount of qubits needed. Running BV algorithm on each Fj needs
n +m+ 1 qubits. Since the executions of BV algorithm is sequential, these
qubits can be reused. Therefore, there are totally n +m + 1 qubits needed
to perform Algorithm 2.
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2.2.3. Advantages
To illustrate the advantages of Algorithm 2, we compare it with the tra-
ditional method of finding high-probability truncated differentials. In con-
ventional differential cryptanalysis, the attacker finds high-probability dif-
ferentials by searching for high-probability differential characteristics. A
differential characteristic is a sequence of input and output differences of
the rounds satisfying that the input difference of one round equals to the
output difference from the last round. In order to find high-probability dif-
ferential characteristics, the attacker examines the properties of each S-boxes
and looks for their high-probability differentials individually. Combining the
difference pairs of S-boxes from round to round, the attack can find a high-
probability differential characteristic containing the plaintext difference and
the difference into the last round. The way to find high-probability truncated
differentials in classical truncated differential cryptanalysis is similar, except
that the input difference and output difference of each round can be only
partially determined. Under the assumption that the differentials of differ-
ent S-boxes are independent (which does not hold strictly, but works well
for most block ciphers in practice), the probability of a truncated differential
characteristic is equal to the product of the differential probabilities of all
active S boxes. As the number of rounds increases, the number of active
S-boxes will also increases, so the probability of the differential characteristic
will be greatly reduced. Therefore, finding high-probability truncated differ-
ential characteristics usually becomes more and more difficult as the number
of rounds increases. By contrast, Algorithm 2 only concerns the input and
output differences at both ends of the reduced cipher Fk, instead of a spe-
cific differential characteristic, so the increase in the number of rounds has
a much smaller effect on Algorithm 2. Therefore, compared with traditional
truncated differential cryptanalysis, Algorithm 2 is more conductive to find-
ing high-probability truncated differentials when the number of the rounds
of the block cipher is large.
Another advantage of Algorithm 2 is that it can find more general high-
probability truncated differentials than conventional methods. As we know,
a high-probability truncated differential does not imply a high-probability
truncated differential characteristic, because there may be multiple differen-
tial characteristics matching this truncated differential, but the probability of
each one is not high. The high-probability truncated differentials whose input
and output differences can be connected by a high-probability characteristic
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is actually restrictive. As analyzed earlier, the traditional method of finding
high-probability truncated differentials is based on finding high-probability
truncated differential characteristics, so the truncated differentials it can find
are restrictive. By contrast, Algorithm 2 only concerns the input and output
differences at both ends, and thus can find more general high-probability
truncated differentials.
No need for quantum queries is also an advantage of Algorithm 2. Being
able to query the cryptographic oracle in quantum superpositions is a strong
requirement for the attacker’s ability. Many recently proposed quantum al-
gorithms for attacking symmetric systems require the ability of querying with
superpositions [9, 16, 22]. Compared with these algorithms, Algorithm 2 has
less demanding requirement for attacker’s ability, and therefore is easier to
implement in practice.
3. Quantum Impossible differential cryptanalysis
Impossible differential cryptanalysis is a chosen-plaintext attack intro-
duced by Biham, Biryukov, and Shamir [2]. While ordinary differential
cryptanalysis makes use of high-probability differentials, impossible differ-
ential cryptanalysis exploits the differentials of probability zero.
We still consider a r-round block cipher E and its reduced version F =
E(r−1). Let K and S be the key spaces of the first r − 1 rounds and the last
round, respectively. When fix a specific key k ∈ K, the action of F on a
block x is denoted by Fk(x). If a differential (∆x,∆y) of Fk satisfies that
Fk(x⊕∆x)⊕ Fk(x) 6= ∆y, ∀x ∈ F
n
2 ,
then it is called an impossible differential of Fk. Impossible differential
cryptanalysis consists of two phases: (I) finding some impossible differen-
tial (∆x,∆y) of Fk; and (II) sieving the subkey of the last round based on
the found impossible differential. In this paper, we focus on the first phase of
impossible differential cryptanalysis, and propose a quantum algorithm for
finding impossible differentials. The proposed algorithm applies the miss-in-
the-middle technique. We present it in Section 4.1, and analyze its validity,
complexity and advantages in Section 4.2.
3.1. Quantum algorithm for finding impossible differentials
The miss-in-the-middle technique [2] has been widely used in traditional
impossible differential cryptanalysis. It has been applied to Skipjack [2],
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IDEA [3], DEAL [11] and so on. The basic idea of miss-in-the-middle tech-
nique is to connect two differential paths of probability one, whose corre-
sponding input and output differences do not match, to obtain an impossible
differential. Specifically, for v ∈ {1, · · · , r− 2}, we divide the reduced cipher
Fk into two parts: Fk = Fˇ
(v)
k2
· Fˆ
(v)
k1
, where Fˆ
(v)
k1
corresponds to the first v
rounds of Fk, F˘
(v)
k2
corresponds to the last r− 1− v rounds, and k = (k1, k2).
The key space K is accordingly divided into two parts K = Kv1 ⊗ K
v
2. If
(∆x1,∆y1) and (∆x2,∆y2) are probability-1 differentials of Fˆ
(v)
k1
and Fˇ
(v)
k2
,
respectively, and ∆y1 6= ∆x2, then (∆x1,∆y2) will be an impossible differ-
ential of Fk. The miss-in-the-middle technique translates the task of finding
impossible differentials into the task of finding probability-1 differentials.
In light of the fact that a linear structure of a Boolean function can in-
duce a probability-1 differential of it, we can apply BV algorithm to find
probability-1 differentials of Fˆ
(v)
k1
and Fˇ
(v)
k2
. For example, suppose Fˆ
(v)
k1
=
(Fˆ
(v)
k1,1
, Fˆ
(v)
k1,2
, · · · , Fˆ
(v)
k1,n
). We can obtain a probability-1 differential of Fˆ
(v)
k1
by
first using Algorithm 1 to find the linear structures of each Fˆ
(v)
k1,j
separately,
and then choosing a common linear structure as the input difference. How-
ever, there is a problem that the attacker has no access to the quantum
oracle of Fˆ
(v)
k1,j
due to his ignorance of k1. To solve this problem, we employ
the function F without specifying the key as in the case of truncated differen-
tial cryptanalysis, and tries to find key-independent impossible differentials.
Specifically, for v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 2}, we also divide F into two parts:
Fˆ (v) : {0, 1}n ×Kv1 → {0, 1}
n Fˇ (v) : {0, 1}n ×Kv2 → {0, 1}
n
(x, k1) → Fˆ
(v)
k1
(x), (x, k2) → Fˇ
(v)
k2
(x).
Then we have F (x, (k1, k2)) = Fˇ
(v)(Fˆ (v)(x, k1), k2). In the following, we
let m, lv, and hv denote the lengths of the keys in K, K
v
1 and K
v
2, respectively,
where lv + hv = m. Suppose Fˆ
(v) = (Fˆ
(v)
1 , · · · , Fˆ
(v)
n ), Fˇ (v) = (Fˇ
(v)
1 , · · · , Fˇ
(v)
n ).
Each Fˆ
(v)
j or Fˇ
(v)
j is deterministic and known to the attacker, so he can
use efficient quantum circuits to implement them by himself. According to
Theorem 2, by running Algorithm 1 on each Fˆ
(v)
j , the attacker is expected to
obtain linear structures of Fˆ
(v)
j . Since the input of Fˆ
(v)
j includes a plaintext
block and a key in Kv1, the linear structures he obtains have n + lv bits,
including n-bit plaintext difference and lv-bit key difference. In order to use
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it to induce a probability-1 differential of Fˆ
(v)
k1 , the last lv bits of the linear
structures need to be zeros. To do this, we only need to discard the last lv
bits of the output vectors when calling BV Algorithm, as done in Algorithm
2. Then the length of the vectors obtained by solving the linear systems
will be n bits, and thus can be used to induced probability-1 differentials of
Fˆ
(v)
k1 . For v = 1, 2, · · · , r − 2, the attacker uses this method to search for
probability-1 differentials of Fˆ
(v)
k1
and Fˇ
(v)
k2
separately until two unmatched
probability-1 differentials are found.
The quantum algorithm for finding impossible differentials of Fk is as
following:
[H] Algorithm 3
Initialization: Quantum circuits for implementing Fˆ
(v)
j and Fˇ
(v)
j (v = 1, · · · , r−
2, j = 1, · · · , n) are given. p(n) is an arbitrary polynomial chosen by the
attacker. All appearing sets are initialized to the null set Φ.
1: for v = 1, 2, · · · , r − 2 do
2: for j = 1, 2, · · · , n do
3: for p = 1, 2, · · · , p(n) do
4: run BV algorithm on Fˆ
(v)
j to obtain an (n+ lv)-bit output ω =
5: (ω1, · · · , ωn, ωn+1, · · · , ωn+lv) ∈ NFˆ (v)
j
;
6: let H = H ∪ {(ω1, · · · , ωn)};
7: end for
8: solve the system of linear equations {x ·ω = tv,j |ω ∈ H} to obtain
the
9: sets A
tv,j
v,j for tv,j = 0, 1, respectively; Let Av,j = A
0
v,j ∪A
1
v,j ;
10: if Av,j ⊆ {0} then
11: break; (Exit current loop)
12: else
13: let H = Φ;
14: end if
15: end for
16: if Av,1 ∩ · · · ∩Av,n ⊆ {0} then
17: continue; (Jump to the next iteration of current loop)
18: else
19: choose an arbitrary nonzero vector a ∈ Av,1 ∩ · · · ∩ Av,n;
20: let (∆x1,∆y1) = (a, tv,1, · · · , tv,n), where tv,1, · · · , tv,n are the super-
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21: scripts such that a ∈ A
tv,1
v,1 ∩ A
tv,2
v,2 ∩ · · · ∩A
tv,n
v,n ;
22: end if
23: for j = 1, 2, · · · , n do
24: for p = 1, 2, · · · , p(n) do
25: run BV algorithm on Fˇ
(v)
j to obtain an (n+hv)-bit output ω =
26: (ω1, · · · , ωn, ωn+1, · · · , ωn+hv) ∈ NFˇ (v)j
;
27: let H = H ∪ {(ω1, · · · , ωn)};
28: end for
29: solve the system of linear equations {x ·ω = sv,j |ω ∈ H} to obtain
the
30: sets B
sv,j
v,j for sv,j = 0, 1, respectively; Let Bv,j = B
0
v,j ∪B
1
v,j ;
31: Let H = Φ;
32: end for
33: if Bv,1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bv,n = Φ then
34: continue;
35: else
36: choose an arbitrary vector b ∈ Bv,1 ∩ · · · ∩Bv,n;
37: let (∆x2,∆y2) = (b, sv,1, · · · , sv,n), where sv,1, · · · , sv,n are the
super-
38: scripts such that b ∈ B
sv,1
v,1 ∩ B
sv,2
v,2 ∩ · · · ∩ B
sv,n
v,n ;
39: end if
40: if ∆y1 6= ∆x2 then
41: output (∆x1,∆y2, 0) and halt;
42: else
43: output (∆x1,∆y2, 1) and halt;
44: end if
45: end for
Lines 2-22 of Algorithm 3 are for finding a probability-1 differential (∆x1,∆y1)
of Fˆ
(v)
k1
, while lines 23-39 are for finding a probability-1 differential (∆x2,∆y2)
of Fˇ
(v)
k2
. Once probability-1 differentials of these two functions are found si-
multaneously for some v, the algorithm halts. When the attacker executes
an impossible differential attack, he first runs Algorithm 3 with p(n) = n.
According to Theorem 4 presented in the next subsection, as long as the
block cipher satisfies certain properties, the vector output by Algorithm 3
will be either an impossible differential or a probability-1 differential of Fk.
Specifically, if the attacker obtains an output (∆x1,∆y2, 0), then except for
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a negligible probability, (∆x1,∆y2) is an impossible differential of Fk. The
attacker can use it to sieve the key of the last round as in classical impossi-
ble differential cryptanalysis. If he obtains (∆x1,∆y2, 1), then except for a
negligible probability, (∆x1,∆y2) is a probability-1 differential of Fk. This
situation is actually more conducive to recover the key of the last round,
but the probability of it happening is usually very small because a well con-
structed cipher usually does not have such strong linearity. Unlike the case
of truncated differential cryptanalysis, no matter the vector obtained via Al-
gorithm 3 is an impossible differential or a probability-1 differential of Fk, its
probability is independent of the key.
3.2. Analysis of the algorithm
In this section, we discuss the validity, complexity and advantages of
Algorithm 3.
3.2.1. Validity
To demonstrate the validity of Algorithm 3, we first define the parameter
δ′F = max{δ
′
Fˆ
(v)
j
, δ′
Fˇ
(v)
j
|1 ≤ v ≤ r − 2, 1 ≤ j ≤ n},
where δ′
Fˆ
(v)
j
, δ′
Fˇ
(v)
j
is defined as in Eq.(2). It is obvious that δ′F < 1. The
smaller δ′F is, the better it is to rule out the vectors that are not the linear
structure of Fˆ (v) or Fˇ (v) when running Algorithm 3. The following theorem
justifies the validity of Algorithm 3:
Theorem 4. Suppose δ′F ≤ p0 < 1 for some constant p0. If applying Algo-
rithm 3 on Fk with p(n) = n outputs (∆x1,∆y2, 0), then except for a negligible
probability, (∆x1,∆y2) is an impossible differential of Fk for all k ∈ K. If it
outputs (∆x1,∆y2, 1), then except for a negligible probability, (∆x1,∆y2) is
a probability-1 differential of Fk for all k ∈ K.
Proof. Since a · (ω1, · · · , ωn) = 0, the vector (a‖0, · · · , 0), obtained by ap-
pending lv zeros to a, satisfies that (a‖0, · · · , 0)·(ω1, · · · , ωn, ωn+1, · · · , ωn+lv) =
0. Thus, (a‖0, · · · , 0) can be viewed as the output when applying Algorithm
1 to Fˆ
(v)
j . Then according to Theorem 2, for all 1 ≤ v ≤ r− 2, all 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
it holds that
Pr[ (a‖0, · · · , 0) /∈ U
tv,j
Fˆ
(v)
j
] ≤ pn0 .
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Since (a‖0, · · · , 0) /∈ U
(tv,1,··· ,tv,n)
Fˆ (v)
implies that there exists some j0 such that
(a‖0, · · · , 0) /∈ U
tv,j0
Fˆ
(v)
j0
, we have
Pr[ (a‖0, · · · , 0) /∈ U
(tv,1,··· ,tv,n)
Fˆ (v)
] ≤ pn0 .
When (a‖0, · · · , 0) ∈ U
(tv,1,··· ,tv,n)
Fˆ (v)
, we have that for all x ∈ Fn2 and all k1 ∈ K
v
1,
Fˆ (v)
(
(x, k1)⊕ (a‖0, · · · , 0)
)
⊕ Fˆ (v)
(
x, k1
)
= (tv,1, · · · , tv,n).
That is,
Fˆ
(v)
k1
(x⊕ a)⊕ Fˆ
(v)
k1
(x) = (tv,1, · · · , tv,n), ∀x ∈ F
n
2 , ∀k1 ∈ K1.
Thus, except for a negligible probability, (a, tv,1, · · · , tv,n) is a probability-1
differential of Fˆ
(v)
k1
for all k1 ∈ K
v
1. Similarly, except for a negligible proba-
bility, (b, sv,1, · · · , sv,n) is a probability-1 differential of Fˇ
(v)
k2
for all k2 ∈ K2.
Since Fk = Fˇ
(v)
k2
· Fˆ
(v)
k1
, the conclusion holds.

According to Theorem 4, as long as δ′F ≤ p0 < 1 for some constant p0
and running Algorithm 3 on F returns a vector, then the vector will be
an impossible differential or a probability-1 differential of Fk except for a
negligible probability. But Theorem 4 does not give the condition under
which Algorithm 3 must output a vector. In fact, under the assumption that
δ′F ≤ p0 < 1, we have stronger conclusion: as long as Fk has an impossible
differential that is composed of two unmatched probability-1 differentials,
Algorithm 3 will, except for a negligible probability, output an impossible
differential or a probability-1 differential of Fk.
To explain why this holds, we suppose Fk has an impossible (∆x,∆y)
that is composed of two unmatched probability-1 differentials. Then there
must exist v ∈ {1, · · · , r − 2}, ∆y1 ∈ F
n
2 and ∆x2 ∈ F
n
2 such that (∆x,∆y1)
and (∆x2,∆y) are probability-1 differentials of Fˆ
(v)
k1
and Fˇ
(v)
k2
respectively, and
∆y1 6= ∆x2. In this case, according to Lemma 1, ∆x must be a solution of the
linear systems {x · ω = ∆y1,j|ω ∈ H} for all j = 1, · · · , n, where ∆y1,j is the
jth bit of ∆y1. Thus, ∆x must be in the set Av , Av,1 ∩ · · · ∩Av,n. Likewise,
∆x2 must be in the set Bv , Bv,1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bv,n. Therefore, as long as Fk has
an impossible differential that is composed of two unmatched probability-1
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differentials, there must exist some v such that the input differences of these
two probability-1 differentials are in the sets Av and Bv, respectively. On
the other hand, according to Theorem 4, as long as the reduced cipher F
satisfies that δ′F ≤ p0 < 1 for some constant p0, the probability of the vectors
in Av (resp. Bv) are not linear structures of Fˆ
(v)
k1
(resp. Fˇ
(v)
k2
) is negligible.
Therefore, as long as Av and Bv are both nonempty, the vectors chosen
respectively from them will form an impossible differential or a probability-1
differential of Fk except for a negligible probability. This justifies the above
conclusion.
Based on the above analysis, if the classical miss-in-the-middle technique
works for some reduced cipher Fk, which means Fk must have an impossible
differential that is composed of two unmatched probability-1 differentials,
then except for a negligible probability, Algorithm 3 will find out an impos-
sible differential or a probability-1 differential of Fk. Therefore, to a certain
extent, we can say that as long as classical miss-in-the-middle technique
works for some block cipher E, which satisfies δ′
E(r−1)
≤ p0 < 1 for some
constant p0, then Algorithm 3 must work for it too.
3.2.2. Complexity
We analyze the complexity of Algorithm 3 from three perspectives: the
number of universal gates, the time complexity of classical computing part
and the amount of qubits needed.
Amount of universal gates. For each v = 1, 2, · · · , r − 2 and j =
1, 2, · · · , n, Algorithm 3 needs to execute BV algorithm on Fˆ
(v)
j and Fˇ
(v)
j for
p(n) times, and each time needs 2(n+lv)+1+|Fˆ
(v)
j |Q and 2(n+hv)+1+|Fˇ
(v)
j |Q
universal gates, respectively. Thus, the total amount of needed universal
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gates is
p(n)
r−2∑
v=1
n∑
j=1
[
2(n+ lv) + 1 + |Fˆ
(v)
j |Q + 2(n+ hv) + 1 + |Fˇ
(v)
j |Q
]
=p(n)
r−2∑
v=1
n∑
j=1
[
4n+ 2 + 2(lv + hv) + |Fˆ
(v)
j |Q + |Fˇ
(v)
j |Q
]
=p(n)
r−2∑
v=1
n∑
j=1
(4n+ 2 + 2m) + p(n)
r−2∑
v=1
( n∑
j=1
|Fˆ
(v)
j |Q +
n∑
j=1
|Fˇ
(v)
j |Q
)
=p(n)(r − 2)n(4n+ 2 + 2m) + p(n)
r−2∑
v=1
(
|Fˆ (v)|Q + |Fˇ
(v)|Q
)
=p(n)(r − 2)n(4n+ 2 + 2m) + p(n)
r−2∑
v=1
|F |Q
=p(n)(r − 2)(4n2 + 2n+ 2mn + |F |Q)
=(r − 2)(4n3 + 2n2 + 2mn2 + n|F |Q),
which is a polynomial of n. The last formula holds since p(n) = n.
Time complexity of classical computing part. The classical com-
puting part of Algorithm 3 includes two phases:
(1) Solve linear systems {x ·ω = tv,j |ω ∈ H} and {x ·ω = sv,j |ω ∈ H} for
each v ∈ {1, 2 · · · , r − 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and tv,j , sv,j ∈ {0, 1};
(2) Find the intersection of the sets Av,j
′s and Bv,j ′s.
For the first phase, the attacker needs to solve 4(r − 2)n linear systems,
each one has p(n) linear equations and n variables. Thus, the complexity of
this phase is O(4(r − 2)np(n)n2) = O(4(r − 2)n4). For the second phase,
the corresponding complexity is determined by the size of the sets Av,j
′s
and Bv,j
′s. Let α = maxv,j{|Av,j|, |Bv,j|}. Since the attacker needs to take
intersection for at most 2(r−2) times, the complexity of this phase is O(2(r−
2)nα logα). Therefore, the total time complexity of classical computing part
is O
(
(r − 2)(2n4 + nα logα)
)
. In general, the value of α is small because a
well constructed cipher should not have many approximate linear structures.
Furthermore, the attacker can reduce the value of α by choosing a larger
p(n).
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Amount of qubits needed. Running BV algorithm on each Fˆ
(v)
j or
Fˇ
(v)
j needs n+ lv + 1 or n+ hv + 1 qubits, respectively. Since both lv and hv
are not larger than m and these qubits can be reused, n +m+ 1 qubits are
enough to perform Algorithm 3.
3.2.3. Advantages
To illustrate the advantages of Algorithm 3, we compare it with classical
miss-in-the-middle technique. The basic idea of miss-in-the-middle technique
is to find impossible differentials by searching for two unmatched probability-
1 differentials. In classical case, the attacker finds probability-1 differentials
by looking for probability-1 differential characteristics. As we analyzed in
the case of truncated differential cryptanalysis, the probability of differential
characteristics will decrease greatly as the number of rounds increases. Thus,
finding probability-1 differential characteristics will become more and more
difficult as the number of rounds increases. By contrast, Algorithm 3 treats
Fˆ
(v)
j and Fˇ
(v)
j as a whole and only cares the input and output differences at
both ends of them. Whether Algorithm 3 works or not does not depend on the
existence of probability-1 differential characteristics. Therefore, compared
with the traditional miss-in-the-middle technique, the increase in the number
of rounds has a much smaller effect on Algorithm 3.
In addition, the existence of a probability-1 differential does not imply
the existence of a probability-1 differential characteristic. The probability-
1 differentials whose input and output differences can be connected by a
probability-1 differential characteristic are actually restrictive. As discussed
above, the impossible differentials found by classical miss-in-the-middle tech-
nique are always connected by two probability-1 differential characteristics,
while the impossible differentials found by Algorithm 3 are connected by two
general probability-1 differentials, without other restrictions. Therefore, to
some extent we can say that the impossible differentials that Algorithm 3 can
find are more general than the impossible differentials that traditional miss-
in-the-middle technique can find. Furthermore, as analyzed in Subsection
4.2.1, for any block cipher E that satisfies δ′
E(r−1)
≤ p0 < 1 for some constant
p0, if classical miss-in-the-middle technique can find an impossible differen-
tial of it, Algorithm 3 must be able to find an impossible (or a probability-1
differential) of it, too.
No need for quantum queries is also an advantage of Algorithm 3. This
reduces the requirement for the attacker’s ability, and makes the attack on
block ciphers more practical. Compared with Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3
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also has the advantage that the impossible differentials found by it are key-
independent, while the truncated differentials found by Algorithm 2 have
high probability only for partial keys.
4. Conclusions and further directions
In this paper, we apply Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm in truncated differ-
ential and impossible differential cryptanalysis. We propose two quantum
algorithms that can be used to find high-probability truncated differentials
and impossible differentials, respectively. We believe our work contributes
to a better understanding of the impact of quantum computing on symmet-
ric cryptanalysis, and provides guidance for the design of quantum-secure
symmetric cryptosystems.
There are still many directions to further investigate. First, it may be
possible to improve the proposed quantum algorithm for finding truncated
differentials so that it can find key-independent high-probability truncated
differentials. Also, how to take the key-recovery process into account for find-
ing the optimized high-probability truncated differentials or impossible dif-
ferentials is worth further studying. In addition, applying Bernstein-Vazirani
algorithm to other variants of differential cryptanalysis, such as higher-order
differential cryptanalysis and boomerang attacks, may leads to interesting
results.
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Appendix A. Signal to noise ratio
In this section we briefly recall the notion of the signal to noise ratio [4],
which gives us a tool for evaluating the usability of a counting scheme based
on a high-probability differential.
In the counting scheme of a (truncated) differential cryptanalysis, the
attacker uses a given high-probability (truncated) differential (∆x,∆y) of
the reduced cipher Fk to recover the key of the last round. Specifically, let S
be the key space of the last round of the block cipher. The attacker first fixes
the input difference ∆x and makes 2N classical queries to obtain 2N ciphers.
Then for each s ∈ S, he decrypts the last round to get N output differences of
Fk, and counts the number of them that match ∆y. The candidate key with
the maximum count is chosen as the key of the last round. The definition of
the signal to noise ratio is as follows:
Definition 4 ([4], Definition 13). The signal to noise ratio of the count-
ing scheme, denoted by S/N , is the ratio between the number of times the
right key is counted and the average times a random key is counted.
Let γ be the average count contributed by each plaintext pair and λ be
the ratio of non-discarded pairs to all pairs. (There may be a procedure
to discarded the wrong pairs before they are actually counted.) Then the
average times a random key is counted is N · λ · γ/|S|, where N is the
number of pairs. Supposing that p is the probability of the used differential
(or truncated differential), then the number of times the right key is counted
is about N · p. Therefore, the signal to noise ratio is
S/N =
N · p
N · λ · γ/|S|
=
|S| · p
λ · γ
.
If S/N ≤ 1, then the differential attack will not succeed.
In the counting scheme, if a pair of ciphertexts, after being decrypted
by the correct key of the last round, matches the output difference of the
given high-probability (truncated) differential, then this pair of ciphertexts
is called the right pair. The amount of pairs required by a counting scheme
is usually related to the amount of right pairs required, which is basically a
function of the signal to noise ratio. If S/N is sufficiently large, only a few
occurrences of right pairs are enough to determine the value of the key of
the last round. It is observed experimentally that, while S/N is 1− 2, about
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20 − 40 right pairs are enough [4]. While S/N is much higher, only 3 − 4
right pairs are sufficient. On average, about O(1
p
) pairs of ciphertexts gives
a right pair. Thus, when S/N is 1− 2, the number of pairs needed is O(40
p
).
To further understand the relation between S/N and the complexity of the
counting scheme, readers are referred to [4, 14] for concrete examples.
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